We study the problem of two competing camps aiming to maximize the adoption of their respective opinions, by optimally investing in nodes of a social network in two phases. The final opinion of a node in phase 1 acts as its bias in phase 2, and this bias determines the effectiveness of a camp's investment on the node. Using an extension of Friedkin-Johnsen model of opinion dynamics, we formulate the camps' utility functions. We show the existence and polynomial time computability of Nash equilibrium under reasonable assumptions. Using simulations, we quantify the effects of the nodes' biases and the weightage attributed to them, as well as that of a camp deviating from its equilibrium strategy.


A Two Phase Investment Game for Competitive Opinion Dynamics in Social Networks

technical paper

AAMAS is the leading scientific conference for research in autonomous agents and multi-agent systems. The AAMAS conference series was initiated in 2002 as the merging of three respected scientific meetings: the International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems (ICMAS), the International Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages (ATAL), and the International Conference on Autonomous Agents (AA). The aim of the joint conference is to provide a single, high-profile, internationally-respected archival forum for scientific research in the theory and practice of autonomous agents and multi-agent systems.

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AAMAS 2020

AAMAS is the leading scientific conference for research in autonomous agents and multi-agent systems. The AAMAS conference series was initiated in 2002 as the merging of three respected scientific meetings: the International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems (ICMAS), the International Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages (ATAL), and the International Conference on Autonomous Agents (AA). 

Eitan Altman

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Presentations

A Two Phase Investment Game for Competitive Opinion Dynamics in Social Networks