United States

Condorcet extensions have long held a prominent place in social choice theory. A Condorcet extension will return the Condorcet winner as the unique winner whenever such an alternative exists. However, the definition of a Condorcet extension does not take into account possible manipulation by the voters. A profile where all agents vote truthfully may have a Condorcet winner, but this alternative may not end up in the set of winners if agents are acting strategically. Focusing on the class of tournament solutions, we show that many natural social choice functions in this class, such as the well-known Copeland and Slater rules, cannot guarantee the preservation of Condorcet winners when agents behave strategically. Our main result in this respect is an impossibility theorem that establishes that no tournament solution satisfying a very weak decisiveness requirement can provide such a guarantee. On the bright side, we identify several indecisive but otherwise attractive tournament solutions that do guarantee the preservation of Condorcet winners under strategic manipulation for a large class of preference extensions.

AAAI 2021

Preserving Condorcet Winners under Strategic Manipulation

AAMAS is the leading scientific conference for research in autonomous agents and multi-agent systems. The AAMAS conference series was initiated in 2002 as the merging of three respected scientific meetings: the International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems (ICMAS), the International Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages (ATAL), and the International Conference on Autonomous Agents (AA). The aim of the joint conference is to provide a single, high-profile, internationally-respected archival forum for scientific research in the theory and practice of autonomous agents and multi-agent systems.

Browse keynotes, discussions, panels and over 300 presentations.


AAMAS 2020

AAMAS is the leading scientific conference for research in autonomous agents and multi-agent systems. The AAMAS conference series was initiated in 2002 as the merging of three respected scientific meetings: the International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems (ICMAS), the International Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages (ATAL), and the International Conference on Autonomous Agents (AA). 

technical paper

The purpose of the AAAI conference is to promote research in artificial intelligence (AI) and scientific exchange among AI researchers, practitioners, scientists, and engineers in affiliated disciplines. 

We consider a sequential assortment selection problem where the user choice is given by a multinomial logit (MNL) choice model whose parameters are unknown. In each period, the learning agent observes a d-dimensional contextual information about the user and the N available items, and offers an assortment of size K to the user, and observes the bandit feedback of the item chosen from the assortment. We propose upper confidence bound based algorithms for this MNL contextual bandit. The first algorithm is a simple and practical method that achieves an O(dâˆšT) regret over T rounds. Next, we propose a second algorithm which achieves a O(âˆšdT) regret. This matches the lower bound for the MNL bandit problem, up to logarithmic terms, and improves on the best-known result by a âˆšd factor. To establish this sharper regret bound, we present a non-asymptotic confidence bound for the maximum likelihood estimator of the MNL model that may be of independent interest as its own theoretical contribution. We then revisit the simpler, significantly more practical, first algorithm and show that a simple variant of the algorithm achieves the optimal regret for a broad class of important applications.

Multinomial Logit Contextual Bandits: Provable Optimality and Practicality

Depth adjustment aims to enhance the visual experience of stereoscopic 3D (S3D) images, which accompanied with improving visual comfort and depth perception. For a human expert, the depth adjustment procedure is a sequence of iterative decision making. The human expert iteratively adjusted the depth until he is satisfied with the both levels of visual comfort and the perceived depth. In this work, we present a novel deep reinforcement learning (DRL)-based approach for depth adjustment named VCA-RL (Visual Comfort Aware Reinforcement Learning) to explicitly model human sequential decision making in depth editing operations. We formulate the depth adjustment process as a Markov decision process where actions are defined as camera movement operations to control the distance between the left and right cameras. Our agent is trained based on the guidance of an objective visual comfort assessment metric to learn the optimal sequence of camera movement actions in terms of perceptual aspects in stereoscopic viewing. With extensive experiments and user studies, we show the effectiveness of our VCA-RL model on three different S3D databases.

Visual Comfort Aware-Reinforcement Learning for Depth Adjustment of Stereoscopic 3D Images

Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept in two-player games where the leader has commitment rights over the follower. In recent years, it has become a cornerstone of many security applications, including airport patrolling and wildlife poaching prevention. Even though many of these settings are sequential in nature, existing techniques pre-compute the entire solution ahead of time. In this paper, we present a theoretically sound and empirically effective way to apply search, which leverages extra online computation to improve a solution, to the computation of Stackelberg equilibria in general-sum games. Instead of the leader attempting to solve the full game upfront, an approximate "blueprint" solution is first computed offline and is then improved online for the particular subgames encountered in actual play. We prove that our search technique is guaranteed to perform no worse than the pre-computed blueprint strategy, and empirically demonstrate that it enables approximately solving significantly larger games compared to purely offline methods. We also show that our search operation may be cast as a smaller Stackelberg problem, making our method complementary to existing algorithms based on strategy generation.

Safe Search for Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games

Domain generalization (DG) offers a preferable real-world setting for Person Re-Identification (Re-ID), which trains a model using multiple source domain datasets and expects it to perform well in an unseen target domain without any model updating. Unfortunately, most DG approaches are designed explicitly for classification tasks, which fundamentally differs from the retrieval task Re-ID. Moreover, existing applications of DG in Re-ID cannot correctly handle the massive variation among Re-ID datasets. In this paper, we identify two fundamental challenges in DG for Person Re-ID: domain-wise variations and identity-wise similarities. To this end, we propose an end-to-end Dual Distribution Alignment Network (DDAN) to learn domain-invariant features with dual-level constraints: the domain-wise adversarial feature learning and the identity-wise similarity enhancement. These constraints effectively reduce the domain-shift among multiple source domains further while agreeing to real-world scenarios. We evaluate our method in a large-scale DG Re-ID benchmark and compare it with various cutting-edge DG approaches. Quantitative results show that DDAN achieves state-of-the-art performance.

Dual Distribution Alignment Network for Generalizable Person Re-Identification

Quantifying systematic disparities in numerical quantities such as employment rates and wages between population subgroups provides compelling evidence for the existence of societal biases. However, biases in the text written for members of different subgroups (such as in recommendation letters for male and non-male candidates), though widely reported anecdotally, remain challenging to quantify. In this work, we introduce a novel framework to quantify bias in text caused by the visibility of subgroup membership indicators. We develop a nonparametric estimation and inference procedure to estimate this bias. We then formalize an identification strategy to causally link the estimated bias to the visibility of subgroup membership indicators, provided observations from time periods both before and after an identity-hiding policy change. We identify an application wherein â€œground truthâ€ bias can be inferred to evaluate our framework, instead of relying on synthetic or secondary data. Specifically, we apply our framework to quantify biases in the text of peer reviews from a reputed machine-learning conference before and after the conference adopted a double-blind reviewing policy. We show evidence of biases in the review ratings that serves as â€œground truthâ€, and show that our proposed framework accurately detects the presence (and absence) of these biases from the review text without having access to the review ratings.

Uncovering Latent Biases in Text: Method and Application to Peer Review

We address the black-box issue of VR sickness assessment (VRSA) by evaluating the level of physical symptoms of VR sickness. For the VR contents inducing the similar VR sickness level, the physical symptoms can vary depending on the characteristics of the contents. Most of existing VRSA methods focused on assessing the overall VR sickness score. To make better understanding of VR sickness, it is required to predict and provide the level of major symptoms of VR sickness rather than overall degree of VR sickness. In this paper, we predict the degrees of main physical symptoms affecting the overall degree of VR sickness, which are disorientation, nausea, and oculomotor. In addition, we introduce a new large-scale dataset for VRSA including 360 videos with various frame rates, physiological signals, and subjective scores. On VRSA benchmark and our newly collected dataset, our approach shows a potential to not only achieve the highest correlation with subjective scores, but also to better understand which symptoms are the main causes of VR sickness.

Towards a Better Understanding of VR Sickness: Physical Symptom Prediction for VR Contents

Molecule optimization is a fundamental task for accelerating drug discovery, with the goal of generating new valid molecules that maximize multiple drug properties while maintaining similarity to the input molecule. Existing generative models and reinforcement learning approaches made initial success, but still face difficulties in simultaneously optimizing multiple drug properties. To address such challenges, we propose the MultI-constraint MOlecule SAmpling (MIMOSA) approach, a sampling framework to use input molecule as an initial guess and sample molecules from the target distribution. MIMOSA first pretrains two property agnostic graph neural networks (GNNs) for molecule topology and substructure-type prediction, where a substructure can be either atom or single ring. For each iteration, MIMOSA uses the GNNsâ€™ prediction and employs three basic substructure operations (add, replace, delete) to generate new molecules and associated weights. The weights can encode multiple constraints including similarity and drug property constraints, upon which we select promising molecules for next iteration. MIMOSA enables flexible encoding of multiple property- and similarity-constraints and can efficiently generate new molecules that satisfy various property constraints and achieved up to 49.1% relative improvement over the best baseline in terms of success rate.

MIMOSA: Multi-Constraint Molecule Sampling for Molecule Optimization

Although large neural language models (LMs) like BERT can be finetuned to yield state-of-the-art results on many NLP tasks, it is often unclear what these models actually learn.  Here we study using such LMs to fill in entities in human-authored comparative questions, like ``Which country is older, India or _____?''---i.e., we study the ability of neural LMs to ask (not answer) reasonable questions.  We show that accuracy in this fill-in-the-blank task is well-correlated with human judgements of whether a question is reasonable, and that these models can be trained to achieve nearly human-level performance in completing comparative questions in three different subdomains. However, analysis shows that what they learn fails to model any sort of broad notion of which entities are semantically comparable or similar---instead the trained models are very domain-specific, and performance is highly correlated with co-occurrences between specific entities observed in the training set.  This is true both for models that are pretrained on general text corpora, as well as models trained on a large corpus of comparison questions. Our study thus reinforces recent results on the difficulty of making claims about a deep model's world knowledge or linguistic competence based on performance on specific benchmark problems. We make our evaluation datasets publicly available to foster future research on complex understanding and reasoning in such models at standards of human interaction.

What's the Best Place for an AI Conference, Vancouver or _______: Why Completing Comparative Questions Is Difficult

The connection between games and no-regret algorithms has been widely studied in the literature. A fundamental result is that when all players play no-regret strategies, this produces a sequence of actions whose time-average is a coarse-correlated equilibrium of the game. However, much less is known about equilibrium selection in the case that multiple equilibria exist. In this work, we study the convergence of no-regret bidding algorithms in auctions. Besides being of theoretical interest, bidding dynamics in auctions is an important question from a practical viewpoint as well. We study the repeated game between bidders in which a single item is sold at each time step and the bidder's value is drawn from an unknown distribution. We show that if the bidders use any mean-based learning rule then the bidders converge with high probability to the truthful pure Nash Equilibrium in a second price auction, in VCG auction in the multi-slot setting and to the Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a first price auction. We note mean-based algorithms cover a wide variety of known no-regret algorithms such as Exp3, UCB, \epsilon-Greedy etc. Also, we analyze the convergence of the individual iterates produced by such learning algorithms, as opposed to the time-average of the sequence. Our experiments corroborate our theoretical findings and also find a similar convergence when we use other strategies such as Deep Q-Learning.

Convergence Analysis of No-Regret Bidding Algorithms in Repeated Auctions

End-to-end neural networks have achieved promising performances in natural language generation (NLG). However, they are treated as black boxes and lack interpretability. To address this problem, we propose a novel framework, heterogeneous rendering machines (HRM), that interprets how neural generators render an input dialogue act (DA) into an utterance. HRM consists of a renderer set and a mode switcher. The renderer set contains multiple decoders that vary in both structure and functionality. For every generation step, the mode switcher selects an appropriate decoder from the renderer set to generate an item (a word or a phrase). To verify the effectiveness of our method, we have conducted extensive experiments on 5 benchmark datasets. In terms of automatic metrics (e.g., BLEU), our model is competitive with the current state-of-the-art method. The qualitative analysis shows that our model can interpret the rendering process of neural generators well. Human evaluation also confirms the interpretability of our proposed approach.

Downloads

Next from AAAI 2021

Multinomial Logit Contextual Bandits: Provable Optimality and Practicality

Similar lecture

Preserving Condorcet Winners under Strategic Manipulation

.css-70qvj9{display:-webkit-box;display:-webkit-flex;display:-ms-flexbox;display:flex;-webkit-align-items:center;-webkit-box-align:center;-ms-flex-align:center;align-items:center;}Downloads

Next from AAAI 2021

Multinomial Logit Contextual Bandits: Provable Optimality and Practicality

Similar lecture

Preserving Condorcet Winners under Strategic Manipulation

Downloads