Abraham Rodríguez-Mota, Ponciano J. Escamilla-Ambrosio and Moisés Salinas-Rosales (November 2nd 2017). Malware Analysis and Detection on Android: The Big Challenge, Smartphones from an Applied Research Perspective, Nawaz Mohamudally, IntechOpen, DOI: 10.5772/intechopen.69695. 

Wiyada Kumam, Plern Saipara and Poom Kumam (November 2nd 2017). Bayesian Inference Application, Bayesian Inference, Javier Prieto Tejedor, IntechOpen, DOI: 10.5772/intechopen.70530. 

Kunikazu Kobayashi, Koji Nakano, Takashi Kuremoto and Masanao Obayashi (February 1st 2010). Objective-based Reinforcement Learning System for Cooperative Behavior Acquisition, Application of Machine Learning, Yagang Zhang, IntechOpen, DOI: 10.5772/8615.

New Zealand

We propose a novel technique for Active Malware Analysis (AMA) formalized as a Bayesian game between an analyzer agent and a malware agent, focusing on the decision making strategy for the analyzer. In our model, the analyzer performs an action on the system to trigger the malware into showing a malicious behavior, i.e., by activating its payload. The formalization is built upon the link between malware families and the notion of types in Bayesian games. A key point is the design of the utility function, which reflects the amount of uncertainty on the type of the adversary after the execution of an analyzer action. This allows us to devise an algorithm to play the game with the aim of minimizing the entropy of the analyzer&#39;s belief at every stage of the game in a myopic fashion. Empirical evaluation indicates that our approach results in a significant improvement both in terms of learning speed and classification score when compared to other state-of-the-art AMA techniques

AAMAS 2020

Bayesian Active Malware Analysis

AAMAS is the leading scientific conference for research in autonomous agents and multi-agent systems. The AAMAS conference series was initiated in 2002 as the merging of three respected scientific meetings: the International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems (ICMAS), the International Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages (ATAL), and the International Conference on Autonomous Agents (AA). The aim of the joint conference is to provide a single, high-profile, internationally-respected archival forum for scientific research in the theory and practice of autonomous agents and multi-agent systems.

Browse keynotes, discussions, panels and over 300 presentations.


AAMAS is the leading scientific conference for research in autonomous agents and multi-agent systems. The AAMAS conference series was initiated in 2002 as the merging of three respected scientific meetings: the International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems (ICMAS), the International Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages (ATAL), and the International Conference on Autonomous Agents (AA). 

We propose a novel technique for Active Malware Analysis (AMA) formalized as a Bayesian game between an analyzer agent and a malware agent, focusing on the decision making strategy for the analyzer. In our model, the analyzer performs an action on the system to trigger the malware into showing a malicious behavior, i.e., by activating its payload. The formalization is built upon the link between malware families and the notion of types in Bayesian games. A key point is the design of the utility function, which reflects the amount of uncertainty on the type of the adversary after the execution of an analyzer action. This allows us to devise an algorithm to play the game with the aim of minimizing the entropy of the analyzer's belief at every stage of the game in a myopic fashion. Empirical evaluation indicates that our approach results in a significant improvement both in terms of learning speed and classification score when compared to other state-of-the-art AMA techniques

technical paper

First price auctions are widely used in government contracts and ads auctions. In this paper, we consider the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) in first price auctions with discrete value distributions. We study the characterization of the BNE in the first price auction and provide an algorithm to compute the BNE at the same time. Moreover, we prove the existence and the uniqueness of the BNE. Some of the previous results in the case of continuous value distributions do not apply to the case of discrete value distributions. In the meanwhile, the uniqueness result in discrete case cannot be implied by the uniqueness property in the continuous case. Unlike
in the continuous case, we do not need to solve ordinary differential equations and thus do not suffer from the solution errors therein. Compared to the method of using continuous distributions to approximate discrete ones, our experiments show that our algorithm is both faster and more accurate."


Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in First-Price Auction with Discrete Value Distributions

Predicting Persuasive Effectivness for Multimodal Behavior Adaptation using Bipolar Weighted Argument Graphs

We study the synthesis of policies for multi-agent systems to implement spatial-temporal tasks. We formalize the problem as a factored Markov decision process subject to so-called graph temporal logic specifications. The transition function and the spatial-temporal task of each agent depend on the agent itself and its neighboring agents. The structure in the model and the specifications enable to develop a distributed algorithm that, given a factored Markov decision process and a graph temporal logic formula, decomposes the synthesis problem into a set of smaller synthesis problems, one for each agent. We prove that the algorithm runs in time linear in the total number of agents. The size of the synthesis problem for each agent is exponential only in the number of neighboring agents,
which is typically much smaller than the number of agents. We demonstrate the algorithm in case studies on disease control and urban security. The numerical examples show that the algorithm can scale to hundreds of agents.
"


Policy Synthesis for Factored MDPs with Graph Temporal Logic Specifications

This work presents the concept of an adaptive safe padding that forces Reinforcement Learning (RL) to synthesise optimal control policies while ensuring safety during the learning process. Policies are synthesised to satisfy a goal, expressed as a temporal logic formula, with maximal probability. Enforcing the RL agent to stay safe during learning might limit the exploration, however we show that the proposed architecture is able to automatically handle the trade-off between efficient progress in exploration (towards goal satisfaction) and ensuring safety. Theoretical guarantees are available on the optimality of the synthesised policies and on the convergence of the learning algorithm. Experimental results are provided to showcase the performance of the proposed method.

Cautious Reinforcement Learning with Logical Constraints

Law codes and regulations help organise societies for centuries, and as AI systems gain more autonomy, we question how human-agent systems can operate as peers under the same norms, especially when resources are contended. We posit that agents must be accountable and explainable by referring to which rules justify their decisions. The need for explanations is associated with user acceptance and trust. This paper's contribution is twofold: i) we propose an argumentation-based human-agent architecture to map human regulations into a culture for artificial agents with explainable behaviour. Our architecture leans on the notion of argumentative dialogues and generates explanations from the history of such dialogues, and ii) we validate our architecture with a user study in the context of human-agent path deconfliction. Our results show that explanations provide a significantly higher improvement in human performance when systems are more complex. Consequently, we argue that the criteria defining the need of explanations should also consider the complexity of a system. Qualitative findings show that when rules are more complex, explanations significantly reduce the perception of challenge for humans.

Culture-Based Explainable Human-Agent Deconfliction

Ontology alignments enable agents to communicate while preserving heterogeneity in their information. Alignments may not be provided as input and should be able to evolve when communication fails or when new information contradicting the alignment is acquired. In the Alignment Repair Game (ARG) this evolution is achieved via adaptation operators. ARG was evaluated experimentally and the experiments showed that agents converge towards successful communication and improve their alignments. However, whether the adaptation operators are formally correct, complete or redundant is still an open question. In this presentation, we introduce a formal framework based on Dynamic Epistemic Logic that allows us to answer this question. This framework allows us (1) to express the ontologies and alignments used, (2) to model the ARG adaptation operators through announcements and conservative upgrades and (3) to formally establish the correctness, partial redundancy and incompleteness of the adaptation operators in ARG.


Agent Ontology Alignment Repair through Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Swarms can be applied in many relevant domains, such as patrolling or rescue. They usually follow simple local rules, leading to complex emergent behavior. Given their wide applicability, an agent may need to take decisions in an environment containing a swarm that is not under its control, and that may even be an antagonist. Predicting the behavior of each swarm member is a great challenge, and must be done under real time constraints, since they usually move constantly following quick reactive algorithms. We propose the first two solutions for this novel problem, showing integrated on-line learning and planning for decision-making with unknown swarms: (i) we learn an ellipse abstraction of the swarm based on statistical models, and predict its future parameters using time-series; (ii) we learn algorithm parameters followed by each swarm member, in order to directly simulate them. We find in our experiments that we are significantly faster to reach an objective than local repulsive forces, at the cost of success rate in some situations. Additionally, we show that this is a challenging problem for reinforcement learning.


Real-time Learning and Planning in Environments with Swarms: A Hierarchical and a Parameter-based Simulation Approach

This paper investigates how to efficiently transition and update policies, trained initially with demonstrations, using off-policy actor-critic reinforcement learning. It is well-known that techniques based on Learning from Demonstrations, for example behavior cloning, can lead to proficient policies given limited data. However, it is currently unclear how to efficiently update that policy using reinforcement learning as these approaches are inherently optimizing different objective functions. Previous works have used loss functions, which combine behavior cloning losses with reinforcement learning losses to enable this update. However, the components of these loss functions are often set anecdotally, and their individual contributions are not well understood. In this work, we propose the Cycle-of-Learning (CoL) framework that uses an actor-critic architecture with a loss function that combines behavior cloning and 1-step Q-learning losses with an off-policy pre-training step from human demonstrations. This enables transition from behavior cloning to reinforcement learning without performance degradation and improves reinforcement learning in terms of overall performance and training time. Additionally, we carefully study the composition of these combined losses and their impact on overall policy learning. We show that our approach outperforms state-of-the-art techniques for combining behavior cloning and reinforcement learning for both dense and sparse reward scenarios. Our results also suggest that directly including the behavior cloning loss on demonstration data helps to ensure stable learning and ground future policy updates.


Integrating Behavior Cloning and Reinforcement Learning for Improved Performance in Dense and Sparse Reward Environments

We present a general model for the operation of a cloud computing server comprised of one or more speed-scalable processors. Typically, tasks are submitted to such a cloud computing server in an online fashion, and the server operator has to schedule the tasks and decides on payments without knowledge about the tasks arriving in the future. Although very natural, this cloud computing problem on speed-scalable processors has not been studied from a mechanism design perspective in the online setting.

We provide a mechanism for this setting, both for a single and multiprocessor environment, that has several desirable properties: (1) the induced game admits a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies and therefore a pure Nash equilibrium, (2) the Price of Anarchy is constant, (3) the mechanism is budget balanced, i.e., the sum of the payments of the agents is equal to the total energy costs, (4) the communication complexity is low, (5) the mechanism is computationally tractable for both the service operator and the agents, and (6) the agents' payment is also intuitive and easy to communicate to them. We also provide a second mechanism with a better Price of Anarchy, which in turn is more involved to implement.

We are able to extend our mechanisms and results to the Bayesian setting, where the type of each agent is drawn independently from some underlying distribution and agents are minimizing their expected costs. In this setting we also show the same approximation factor of our mechanism as in the basic online setting in both the single and the multiprocessor environment.


A General Framework for Energy-Efficient Cloud Computing Mechanisms

Moving nodes in a Mobile Wireless Sensor Network (MWSN) typically have two maintenance objectives: (i) extend the coverage of the network as long as possible to a target area, and (ii) extend the longevity of the network as much as possible. 
As nodes move and also route traffic in the network, their battery levels deplete differently for each node. 
Dead nodes lead to loss of connectivity and even to disengaging full parts of the network. 
Several reactive and rule-based approaches have been proposed to solve this issue by adapting redeployment to depleted nodes. 
However, in large networks a cooperative approach may increase performance by taking the evolution of node battery and traffic into account. 
In this paper, we present a hybrid agent-based architecture that addresses the problem of depleting nodes during the maintenance phase of a MWSN. 
Agents, each assigned to a node, collaborate and adapt their behaviour to their battery levels. 
The collaborative behavior is modeled through the willingness to interact abstraction, which defines when agents ask and give help to one another. 
Thus, depleting nodes may ask to be replaced by healthier counterparts and move to areas with less traffic or to a collection point. 
At the lower level, negotiations trigger a reactive navigation behaviour based on Social Potential Fields (SPF). 
It is shown that the proposed method improves coverage and extends network longevity in an environment without obstacles as compared to SPF alone.

Bayesian Active Malware Analysis

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Bayesian Active Malware Analysis

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Next from AAMAS 2020

Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in First-Price Auction with Discrete Value Distributions

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CopyCAT: Taking Control of Neural Policies with Constant Attacks

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